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Abstract  
We investigate urban GDP pc growth across the EU12 using data for functionally defined 
cities - rather than administrative regions. We test hypotheses on the role of human capital, 
EU integration and fragmentation of urban government and explore spatial dependence and 
mechanisms of spatial interaction. Results are acceptable on standard econometric tests 
without measures of spatial interaction but there is spatial dependence. If variables reflecting 
spatial adjustment are included, they are statistically significant and eliminate spatial 
dependence. Not only do the results now provide consistent estimates of parameters, they 
also support relevant theoretical insights and show national borders are still significant 
barriers to economic adjustment. People in Europe are sticky so it is unreasonable to assume 
spatial disparities will disappear. Our findings also imply that cities in Europe form national 
rather than a single continental system.  
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1. Introduction  
This paper is about the fundamental drivers of urban growth: in particular in a European institutional 
and geographic context. There is a powerful and rigorous US tradition analysing regional or urban 
growth in a neo-classical framework assuming full spatial equilibrium. A good exemplar is Glaeser 
et al (1995). They build on the compensating differentials model of Roback (1982). Full spatial 
equilibrium implies that people cannot improve their welfare by moving from one location to another 
whether that is between neighbourhoods in one city or from one city to another. Differences in 
prices, for quality constant houses, or wages, for productivity constant workers, signal differences in 
the value of environmental amenities across space. People equalise real welfare, not even just real 
wages, across space, so they accept higher house prices and/or lower wages to live and/or work in 
more desirable locations. So Glaeser et al (1995) conclude that since people vote with their feet, the 
best measure of changing patterns of spatial welfare is differential rates of population growth as a 
result of net migration: not differential rates of productivity growth, manifesting itself in different 
rates of output or GDP per capita growth. 
 
Empirically the most important of these environmental factors leading to quality of life differences 
between regions seems to be climate (see Graves, 1976; 1980 and 1983; or 2003a & b; Rappaport, 
2007) but there is a more elaborate literature analysing spatial differences in the ‘quality of life’ 
building on full spatial equilibrium as an underlying assumption. Gyourko and Tracy (1991), for 
example, include in their estimates the implied value of differences in local public goods. Several 
recent articles by Glaeser and associates (for example Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2006) implicitly use the 
assumption of full spatial equilibrium as support for an analysis of the causes of ‘urban resurgence’ 
and the rediscovery of the ‘consumer city’. They observe real wages have been falling in cities 
relative to non-urban areas because urban productivity and wages have not risen as fast as urban 
house prices. Since city population(s) have been stabilising, however, they conclude that urban 
resurgence is more because of the rising attractiveness of cities as places to live (significantly 
because of falling urban crime rates) than because of increasing agglomeration economies driving 
factor productivity growth in cities compared to non-urban areas. 
 
Europe is a continent of nation states with only recent and partial steps towards integration. It is, 
moreover, a continent of geographically very sticky people. The reasons for Europeans’ low 
responsiveness to differences in opportunities across space seem complex. The costs of movement 
are high compared to the US, because of transactions costs and housing policies (social housing is a 
much larger fraction of the stock in most EU countries and place-specific and rent controlled housing 
ties people to their existing locations). Probably more important, however, are differences in culture, 




 language and institutions. For whatever reason, in an earlier paper (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) we 
showed that while population movement across the EU of 12 between 1980 and 2000 did 
significantly respond to generalised differences in economic advantage (as reflected, for example, in 
the systematic spatial effects of European integration or regional inheritances of old resource-based 
industries), and also responded to climatic differences, the evidence was inconsistent with full spatial 
equilibrium. The response of population movement to economic factors was sluggish; net migration 
rates between comparably sized regions in the USA are fifteen times greater than in Europe 
(Cheshire and Magrini, 2006). Perhaps more telling, population movement responded strongly to 
climatic differences but only to climatic differences within countries. There was no significant 
migration response to climatic differences measured across Europe as a whole. Moreover population 
growth interactions between regions were strongly impeded by national borders. 
 
This finding provides additional interest to trying to understand better the drivers of urban economic 
growth – the main focus of this paper. It implies that Europe is not typified by full spatial equilibrium 
and even if migration flows did reduce spatial disparities, real differences in welfare between regions 
may be strongly persistent. Differences in levels of real per capita GDP or in its growth, are unlikely 
to be fully offset by counterbalancing differences in environmental quality or amenities. This 
investigation of the drivers of economic growth differences across the city-regions of the EU has 
implications for wider themes, therefore. It carries strong implications for whether it is reasonable to 
think of a single European ‘urban system’; it sheds light on the mechanisms producing spatial 
economic adjustment and how national borders still impede this while dense urbanisation and good 
transport links facilitate it; it reveals an important limitation of the Tiebout hypothesis1; and it 
implies that concern for spatial disparities in GDP per capita or growth, may be reasonable in 
Europe, if policy aims to reduce spatial welfare differences for similar individuals.   
 
In addressing questions of differential spatial growth the question immediately arises: what are the 
most appropriate spatial units to look at? US urban scholars automatically use data for core-based 
metropolitan regions (or CBSAs)2.  These were originally known as Standard Metropolitan Areas 
(SMAs) but precise criteria for defining them and the names applied have evolved over time. US 
textbooks such as Mills and Hamilton (1994) or DiPasquale and Wheaton (1996) hardly discuss the 
                                                 
1 Tiebout (1956) is one of the most highly cited papers in local public finance and in applied urban economics. This 
analyses a world in which people can vote with their feet for the package of local public goods and services which best 
suits their incomes and preferences and shows that under the assumption of full spatial equilibrium and no local public 
policy spillovers competition between local jurisdictions can produce optimal sets of local public goods. The issue here is 
that in the context of European systems of local government we need to consider a world in which people are not 
perfectly mobile and there may be important classes of local public goods which have spatial spillovers associated with 
their consumption and/or their production. 
2 Now known as Core-Based Statistical Areas – or CBSAs. The responsibility for this system of urban definitions rests 
with the Office of Management and Budget (2000). 
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 reasons for using data for this standard urban concept or even alternative definitions of urban areas, 
except to mention the existence of administrative ‘cities’. A good review of US and European 
concepts and definitions of urban areas and how US definitions have evolved over time is provided 
in Freeman (2005).  
 
Data for core-based city-regions have a number of critical advantages: criteria used to define them 
are uniform across the whole US, so while political boundaries compared to actual settlement 
patterns are highly variable, the data for CBSAs relate to comparable concepts of ‘city’; because 
CBSAs include both employment and the residents who hold the jobs, they are in economic terms as 
self-contained as spatial subdivisions of national economies are likely to be; they cover the whole 
urban area, so they abstract from patterns of residential segregation – they include all citizens, both 
rich and poor, and all ethnic groups. The data for these US core-based city-regions are also available 
as time series – for population going back to 1790 – for both constant definitional boundaries and 
boundaries which evolve as settlements evolved and commuting systems expanded.  
 
Some European countries have data for consistent definitions of urban areas for long periods – the 
French data for a particular definition of the built-up area of cities - the agglomération - are available 
back to 1831 (Guérin-Pace, 1995); others have data for core-based functional definitions of ‘city’ 
(for example Germany); but unfortunately definitions vary greatly across countries and some 
county’s definitions do not usefully translate to others. For example, in France, until recently the 
concept of the agglomération corresponded quite closely to that of a city-region since land use 
planning in France permitted continuous expansion of built-up areas and did not attempt to impose 
growth boundaries (unlike the British or Dutch systems) and urban centres in France are mainly 
some distance apart. Applying the French agglomération concept to the very different legal and 
geographical setting of Belgium, however, ends up having just one continuous Belgian city – 
stretching from Antwerp to Liége. As a result it is not surprising that even some European urban 
scholars wanting to understand more about how cities work have turned to US data (one of many 
examples would be Duranton and Puga, 2005). There is a large enough number of consistently 
defined city-regions in the US for statistical analysis and the data are comparable and freely 
available. 
 
The analysis in this paper employs data for a specific definition of core-based city regions - Functional 
Urban Regions (FURs – see section 2) – in the EU of 12. More detail is given in Section 3 but the FUR 
dataset was first constructed as the foundation for a research project funded by the European 
Commission during the 1980s (and that drew on earlier work by Hall and Hay, 1980). The results of 
this, together with details of how the FURs were defined and some of the data, were set out in Cheshire 
and Hay, 1989. This FUR dataset has been continuously updated and expanded and the analysis 
reported here uses the most recent version. In Appendix 2 we provide an illustrative map of these FURs 
and more detailed maps for two countries showing how their boundaries relate to those of the official 
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 administrative regions.  
 
2. Issues and approach 
In a world characterised by full spatial equilibrium and a constant distribution of environmental 
amenities the drivers of spatial population growth would be the direct complement of the drivers of 
economic growth. Both processes are worth investigating but understanding one illuminates the 
other. The finding reported in Cheshire and Magrini (2006) that full spatial equilibrium is not a 
reasonable assumption in the context of European spatial development therefore focuses additional 
interest in understanding better what factors drive urban economic growth differentials – the subject 
of this paper.  
 
 The ‘new economic geography’, initiated by Krugman (1991), has re-awakened interest amongst 
mainstream economists in agglomeration economies; as a result, interest in cities and their 
contribution to economic productivity has risen up the agenda. At the same time, internationalisation 
of the world’s economy and European integration have created an interest in and focused more 
policy efforts on, local economic development. Against this background we hope this paper makes a 
particular contribution: to understanding the fundamental drivers of urban growth and the welfare 
impacts differences in growth may generate; how such growth should be measured and the 
implications of alternative measures; and how these forces play out in the particular European 
context of geographically sticky people, continuing national barriers to adjustment but dense 
urbanisation. At the same time we apply the tools of spatial econometrics to help understand and 
interpret spatial economic processes rather than as simply diagnostic tools or providers of technical 
fixes.  
 
In developing and testing propositions about the sources of urban growth we draw as clearly as possible 
on underlying theory. One contribution of this paper is to test – indirectly - whether local growth 
policies have any positive impact on growth. We do this, however starting from a theoretical proposition 
in local public finance and treating the production of additional local growth as if it were the production 
of a local public good. When we explore the empirical results for evidence and sources of spatial 
dependence we attempt to provide an economic interpretation for those results, and draw implications 
for the extent of spatial disequilibrium in Western Europe and the claim that Europe is a ‘network of 
cities’ (Kresl, 2007 page 1).  
 
Our conclusion is that city-regions in the EU behave like city-states, but city-states confined by national 
boundaries.  Their trajectories are influenced by conditions in their neighbours within their own 
countries but they do not behave as simply the spatial units from which an integrated continental 
economy is constructed. This implies that differences in GDP per capita across EU cities not only reflect 
differences in productivity but also differences in welfare. 
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In this paper while we are using cross sectional growth models, we are not taking the convergence 
approach of the numerous studies following Barro (1990) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991). For 
recent surveys of the β-convergence literature see, for example, Durlauf and Quah (1999), Temple 
(1999) or Magrini (2004). We reject the β-convergence approach as uninformative and perhaps 
misleading for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Theoretical reasons are discussed in Cheshire and 
Malecki (2004). The analysis done for this paper reinforces the empirical objections to the approach.  
 
The β-convergence approach includes the initial level of GDP p.c. as an independent variable (with a 
range of additional control variables to account for differences in steady states and idiosyncratic 
‘shocks’) and tests whether poorer nations/regions at the start of the given period grow faster on average 
than those that were richer. To the extent that they do, this provides a measure of their rate of 
convergence. Where the observational units are subdivisions of national territories, such as regions, then 
the standard approach is to include national dummies to control for all country-specific omitted 
variables. On theoretical grounds our preference is not to use national dummies to control for country-
specific effects (such as the temporal incidence of the economic cycle, institutional or policy 
differences) systematically affecting FUR growth, but to include the rate of growth of the national 
territories outside the areas of the major FURs. That major FURs do not exhaust national territories is 
thus turned to advantage, since it allows the estimation of a continuous variable (‘non-FUR growth’) to 
account for national specific factors in urban growth differentials. This is consistent with the underlying 
assumption in cross-sectional regression models that the observational units are representative of a 
homogeneous statistical population. It also has the practical advantage of avoiding having to pool FURs 
for those countries with only one or a very small number of major cities (such as Ireland, Denmark, 
Greece or Portugal).  
 
What emerges is that our preferred variable not only statistically dominates national dummies but, once 
included, renders the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. non-significant and the parameter estimate unstable. 
If both the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. and non-FUR growth are included as additional independent 
variables of interest, in some models apparently (non-significant) convergence emerges; in others non-
significant divergence emerges. Clearly including both the initial level of FUR GDP p.c. and the non-
FUR growth variables introduces collinearity. The remedy for problems of collinearity, if additional 
observations are not available, is to exclude the least satisfactory variable associated with the problem. 
Since we have both theoretical and empirical reasons for excluding it, therefore, we exclude the initial 
level of FUR GDP p.c. This is consistent with our aim which is to understand more fully drivers of 
urban growth differentials rather than to investigate β-convergence which we consider theoretically 
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 unsatisfactory anyway. Our underlying view is that regional growth differences are multivariate: the 
impact of some drivers is towards convergence (e.g. factor mobility in sectors without economies of 
scale) while the impact of others is towards divergence (e.g. those involving agglomeration or 
economies of scale) and which of the convergence/divergence effects dominates in any particular time 
period is an empirical issue. 
 
We are interested in testing theoretically derived ideas about urban growth. For this we have three 
groups of variables; two of these were tested in an earlier paper (Cheshire and Magrini, 2000) but now 
more rigorously. The first group relates to the systematic spatial effects of European integration on 
urban growth. Concern about these goes back at least to Clark et al. (1969) and it is interesting to use as 
an independent variable the quantitative measures actually predicted by Clark before the impact of 
European integration was significantly felt. Theoretical developments of New Economic Geography 
(summarised in Fujita et al. 1999) have given a significant boost to interest in this potential source of 
differential urban growth. In addition to the variable measuring Clark et al’s (1969) change in regional 
economic potential, associated with EU integration, we now introduce a ‘peripherality’ dummy, 
exploiting the insights gained testing for spatial dependence.  
 
The second group of variables we are interested in attempts to capture the role of R&D and highly 
skilled human capital in urban growth processes. It is admittedly a crude test but does show whether the 
evidence is or is not consistent with a spatialised adaptation of endogenous growth theory (see, for 
example, Cheshire, 1995 or Magrini, 1998). In the revised data set used here we have new measures 
which prove slightly more significant and illuminating than results reported previously.  
 
The third area is entirely new; this is the relationship between systems of local and regional government 
and city growth performance. This relates to the wider issue of the provision of local public goods when 
there is also the possibility of what might be called an ‘anti-Tiebout’ world (Tiebout, 1956) with 
jurisdictional public good spillovers and geographically immobile people. In such circumstances, 
optimality may depend also on how jurisdictions are bounded. Local economic growth policies aim to 
increase the rate of economic growth of the territory/jurisdiction to which they are applied. If we 
suspend our disbelief and assume such policies might influence growth rates – abstracting for the 
moment from what form such policies might take – then it is clear that local policy makers would be 
producing a local quasi-public good. So, the relevant issue is what factors favour the formation of more 
effective growth promotion ‘clubs’? The hypothesis advanced in Cheshire and Gordon (1996) was that 
such ‘clubs’ would be more likely to develop and be more strategically effective if the administrative 
boundaries of the jurisdiction more closely corresponded to those of the functional economic region. 
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 The logic underlying this was that the more closely these boundaries coincided, the smaller would be 
spillover losses of growth gains to agents in surrounding jurisdictions and the lower would be the 
transactions costs of forming a ‘growth promotion club’ because there would be fewer public sector 
agencies involved and a more obvious and powerful leading agency.  
 
Since our FURs are designed to maximise self-containment3, they correspond to ‘functional economic 
regions’ and we are able, in effect, to test one of the basic propositions of fiscal federalism: that ‘the 
existence and magnitude of spillover effects clearly depends on the geographical extent of the relevant 
jurisdiction’ (Oates, 1999, page 1130). To test this we include as an independent variable a measure of 
the extent to which the two sets of boundaries coincide for each FUR. If local growth promotion policies 
have any positive effect then the expectation is that the more closely the two boundaries coincide the 
faster a FUR’s growth rate will be – other things equal. 
 
Since we are analysing urban growth in a cross sectional model, we expect interactions between the 
growth performance of neighbouring cities. We have, therefore, paid particular attention to issues of 
spatial dependence. Contrary to the more orthodox spatial dependence literature (see, for example, Rey 
and Montouri, 1999 or Florax et al., 2003), we view indicated problems of spatial dependence as signs 
of omitted variable(s). If there is a problem of spatial dependence the model does not include variable(s) 
reflecting mechanisms that cause economic conditions in one FUR systematically to influence 
developments in its neighbours. If these variables are not included, therefore, not only may parameter 
estimates be inconsistent (although there are econometric fixes available) but it should prompt 
researchers to find suitable (spatial) variables reflecting the mechanisms giving rise to the spatial 
dependence. 
 
Both theory and empirical evidence suggest that there are important spatial adjustment mechanisms and 
other spatially determined features of urban and regional economies. For example, labour markets and 
housing markets adjust to price and real wage differences in ways conditioned on measures of 
                                                 
3 As noted they are defined so as to include significant geographical concentrations of jobs and all residents who 
commute to that employment centre. Thus in the short term all residents within a given FUR will benefit from 
employment or income growth within it; and the boundaries of the FUR will include the great majority of potential 
beneficiaries from growth. This is a ‘short term’ view and excludes induced migration in response to changing 
employment prospects or wages and also excludes trade and capital flows.  Arguably growth promotion agencies are 
motivated by short run factors (‘a week is a long time in politics’); certainly results in the conceptual short run are likely 
to be extremely influential. But since no data are available for sub national trade or capital flows, from a practical point 
of view it is reasonable to argue that FURs are the closest spatial units to self-contained economic regions one can 
construct a data set for and are the most economically self-contained subdivisions of national territories which exist. 
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 accessibility. Both migration and commuting patterns are known to respond to spatial differences in 
economic opportunities – whether of incomes or house prices – but the impact of a given differential in 
economic opportunities declines as accessibility falls. Theoretical and empirical investigations of 
agglomeration economies, human capital and innovation suggest there are important spatial aspects of 
these, too. These are all possible sources of spatial interaction between cities’ economies and, if omitted, 
they should plausibly cause spatial dependence.  
 
Our results provide strong supporting evidence for this view. Models without variables reflecting spatial 
adjustment processes display significant problems of spatial dependence. However, when we include 
appropriate variables, discounted by distance between cities, these are statistically significant and 
indications of spatial dependence are eliminated.  
 
In addition, the sensitivity of our models to measures of spatial dependence varies with the particular 
distance weights used. We interpret this, too, as providing insight into economic processes. We 
systematically experiment with distance weights including ‘distance’ penalties for national borders. 
These experiments confirm that problems of spatial dependence only reveal themselves if an additional 
distance penalty to adjustment between neighbouring FURs is included for national borders, and that 
this seems to be optimised, in some sense, if the penalty is set at 600 minutes. This, we judge, reinforces 
our earlier conclusion that urban systems in Western Europe still mainly adjust as a set of national urban 
systems rather than as a unified EU urban system. European economic space is not a single integrated 
network of cities. 
 
3. The data and methods 
The basic method for defining the Functional Urban Regions analysed in this paper was to identify 
spatial units where there were at least 20 000 jobs and add to these all contiguous spatial units with a job 
density exceeding 12.35 jobs per hectare. These then define the ‘city-cores’ and for each of these, 
hinterlands were defined from which more commuters flowed to the core than to any other, subject to a 
minimum cut off level of commuting. They were defined on 1971 employment and commuting data4 
                                                 
4 There are arguments both for and against using fixed boundaries. An argument against is that actual boundaries change 
over time as the location of employment and people changes. The impact of such changes has been investigated for a 
subset of 25 FURs in the course of an INTERREG IIB Project (GEMACA, 2003). Details are available from the authors 
but the range of changes in total population estimates for 1991 using first boundaries defined on 1971 employment and 
commuting then boundaries defined on 1991 data was mainly from 5 to 10 percent. London was an outlier with 
population some 35 percent greater on its 1991 patterns of employment location and commuting. Changes in estimated 
employment were always considerably smaller than for population. In practical terms we can anyway do no better than 
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 and as noted above are broadly similar to the Core Based Areas used in the US although FUR 
hinterlands tend to be extensive where there are no competing employment centres (examples are 
Lisbon or Dublin). FURs thus correspond to the economic spheres of influence of significant 
employment concentrations. Here we are only analysing data for the largest FURs – those with a 
population of a third of a million in 1981 and a core exceeding 200 000 at some date since 1951. The 
unification of Germany means that comparable data for the current FUR of Berlin are only available 
since 1990. So Berlin and the FURs of the former GDR are excluded. This leaves a total of 121 FURs. 
 
Apart from the advantage of being economically self-contained, the great variability in the relationship 
between administrative and economic boundaries of European cities and regions introduces serious error 
and potential bias into data reported for administrative boundaries. The EU’s Nomenclature des Unités 
Territoriales Statistiques (NUTS) regions are a nesting set which tries to reconcile different national 
territorial divisions. The largest are Level 1 regions; the smallest with reasonable data availability are 
Level 3. The size of these NUTS regions – even within the same ‘Level’ and country – is highly 
variable. A further problem is that no ‘Level’ is represented in every country: in many they exist only 
for statistical reporting. Thus, the most widely used regions – Level 2 – do not exist in Germany or the 
UK. Particularly in Germany, this presents serious data problems because the Level 1 regions, 
corresponding to the Länder, have considerable independence and their own statistical services. In 
addition, Germany has not had a population census since 1987 and uses its own labour market regions 
for most labour market data5.  
 
One of the variables most subject to distortion using NUTS boundaries is GDP p.c. because GDP is 
estimated at workplaces while people are counted where they live. Because people commute to work 
across administrative boundaries, this means GDP p.c. is systematically overestimated for regions where 
the administrative boundaries exclude significant dormitory areas. In reality, this happens for a large 
number of bigger European cities (Madrid and Paris are two exceptions if we take the Level 1 regions 
which contain them), so official figures tend to systematically overstate GDP p.c. for large cities. At last, 
this distortion of GDP p.c. data has been recognised by Eurostat (Eurostat, 2005). Following the 1998 
split of Greater London into two official regions6 – Inner and Outer London – the absurdity of the 
resulting GDP p.c. measures – with Inner London having a reported per capita GDP 3.15 times the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                    
use the fixed if obsolescent boundaries.  
5 Since 1999 a uniform statistical system for German Kreise – Level 3 regions – has been established, INKPAR, but this 
is too recent for our purposes. 
6 The FUR of London used here was nearly 30% larger in population terms than the NUTS Level 1 region of Greater 
London. 
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 mean – became too great to continue to ignore.  
 
The FUR and NUTS region of Bremen provide an extreme example of how this distorts measured 
growth rates as well as levels of GDP p.c. as, over time, people move relative to jobs. Because of strong 
population decentralisation over the period, the growth of GDP p.c. is overstated by some 40% for the 
1980s if the Eurostat data for the NUTS Level 1 region identified as Bremen are relied on.  
 
The variables used are identified in Table 1. All variables are scaled so that estimated parameter 
variables are of similar orders of magnitude to help presentation. Appendix Table 1 gives more detail, 
including the sources used and descriptive statistics.  
 
 
FUR growth in real GDP p.c. is estimated from common PPS values of GDP p.c. for Eurostat Level 3 
regions. We estimate GDP p.c. for FURs using the proportionate distribution of FUR population 
between Level 3 regions at the closest practical dates and applying these as weights to the relevant Level 
3 GDP p.c.7 To minimise the effects of measurement error, we take the start and end points of the series 
as the means for the first and last three years. Regional GDP data have been published for most Level 1, 
2 and 3 regions since 1978 although there is fragmentary earlier data. There are, however, gaps even 
since 1978 – data for Greek and Portuguese regions, for example, did not become available until the 
mid-1980s. In both cases, Eurostat data have been supplemented with national data. For some countries 
– Italy for example – data for earlier years were only published for Level 2 regions. National sources of 
value added for smaller spatial units have been used as necessary to disaggregate from Level 2.   
 
The end point of our GDP series is 1994. Eurostat substantially revised the basis on which regional GDP 
was estimated in 1995. It switched from a 1979 base for disaggregating national data (ESA79) to 
(ESA95). For the overlap year the differences between the two sets of values are remarkable – not even 
country totals coincide. Although some claim to bridge this discontinuity in regional GDP data, we have 
not been able to do so to our satisfaction. So, our analysis finishes in 1994. We are thus analysing a 
                                                 
7 To illustrate this process of estimation with the example of Bremen: the population of our FUR was divided between 
seven NUTS 3 regions for which we had Eurostat GDP p.c. data. In 1991, the proportionate distribution of Bremen’s 
population between these NUTS regions was 0.4345, 0.1508, 0.1128, 0.0942, 0.0767, 0.0713 and 0.0597. These 
proportions were applied as weights to each of the seven NUTS regions’ GDP p.c. to estimate the value of GDP p.c. for 
the FUR of Bremen.  We also have the proportionate distribution of FUR populations between NUTS 3 regions as at 
1981. The FUR data for any year were estimated using population weights calculated from national population censuses 
or registration data closest in time to that for which the Level 3 regions’ data (e.g. GDP p.c.) related. 
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 period – 1978-80 to 1992-94 – too short to correspond to a conceptual long run. This further reinforces 
our belief that we need to model a system in which real incomes can permanently (in the sense of any 
period we can observe) vary between cities.  
 
All data are defined to common statistical concepts either weighting Eurostat data to estimate values for 
FURs (as with GDP p.c.) or collecting data directly from national statistical offices or common data 
providers and adjusting where necessary to common definitions. There is necessarily imprecision where 
we use estimated data but they have the merit of relating to functionally defined, economically self-
contained city-regions. The FURs, all being large metropolitan regions, are also substantially more 
homogenous than either NUTS regions or countries. This is econometrically helpful and since they do 
not exhaust national territories we can calculate the rate of GDP p.c. growth in the area of each country 
outside its major city-regions; as discussed above, this variable is ‘non-FUR growth’. This is a 
continuous variable and is a more elegant and useful control than national dummies for national specific 
drivers of urban growth differentials. It is also consistent with our implicit claim that our observations – 
all the large city-regions of the EU of 12 – represent, in a statistical sense, a homogeneous population. 
 
The analysis employs OLS but we test the results exhaustively for econometric problems. Since the 
observations represent the population of West European city-regions, the force of the standard 
objections to the use of cross sectional OLS for inference seem to be substantially mitigated. Compared 
to cross country ‘growth regressions’, our observations represent a relatively homogeneous population 
and data are more comparable. Our choice of spatial units should reduce or eliminate systematic spatial 
error in the data, or ‘nuisance’ spatial dependence as Anselin and Rey called it (Anselin and Rey, 1991), 
and we make a strong effort to formulate variables to reflect causal mechanisms and minimise problems 
of endogeneity. As with all applied econometrics, however, in the end the credibility of the results is not 
a categorical issue but depends on judgement. We are convinced multicollinearity is not a significant 
problem and judge that this is also true with respect to endogeneity. But proving endogeneity is neither 
present nor seriously distorting results is ultimately proving a negative and that is difficult. We 
necessarily make compromises but believe that the departure from the ideal conditions is not so great 
that the results are spurious for purposes of inference. 
 
4. Results 
4.1 The base model 
As discussed above, our approach to testing the hypotheses relating to the role of European integration, 
human capital and R&D and arrangements for local government builds on previous work (Cheshire and 
Magrini, 2000). As the first step in our more elaborate strategy to investigate growth drivers we first find 
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 a ‘base model’ (see Table 2) and test the resulting model for a range of econometric problems, including 
spatial dependence. Such tests show that while traditional standards for normality, functional form and 
heterskedasticity are satisfied, if the spatial weights matrix is formulated in an economically meaningful 
way (with an added time-distance penalty for national frontiers) there are indicated problems of spatial 
dependence which can be eliminated, without affecting the significance of other variables, by including 
a spatial lag of the dependent variable. In a conventional spatial econometrics framework such a result 
might have been considered satisfactory but we interpret the indications of spatial dependence as 
implying that variables related to systematic spatial patterns of growth have been omitted.  
 
Since the aim is to understand the drivers of differential patterns of spatial growth better we include the 
variables designed to test the three hypotheses (Table 3) in the base model. Again exhaustive 
experimentation with the spatial weights matrix suggests there are some problems of spatial dependence 
(Table 4). Instead of simply re-estimating with a spatial lagged model and stopping the investigation at 
this point, however, we include variables to reflect known information on drivers of differential spatial 
patterns of growth in the EU and on plausible spatial adjustment processes. Such variables are 
statistically significant when included and eliminate all problems of spatial dependence without 
changing other estimates. 
 
This section explains the structure of the models and the reasons for variable inclusion. We try to make 
it self-contained but not too repetitive of previous published work. We concentrate on the results for the 
new variables and the impact of spatial dependence. In all models, the dependent variable was the 
annualised rate of growth of FUR GDP p.c. at PPS from the mean of 1978//80 to 1992/4. The ‘base 
model’ includes a set of control variables and the non-FUR growth variable discussed above. As in 
previous work the controls for industrial structure relate to measures of old resource-based industries – 
agriculture, coal mining and ports. These not only work better in statistical terms than broader measures 
of specialisation in manufacturing industry but, make better sense in economic terms and minimise 
problems of endogeneity. Past dependence on the coal industry is measured by the geological presence 
of coal measures, so should avoid any hint of endogeneity, and specialisation in agriculture and the port 
industry are both measured well before the start of the period to which the dependent variable relates.  
 
Other controls are designed to reflect underlying (urban) economic theory and evidence. The log of 
population size is included with the expectation that larger cities would have grown faster because of 
productivity gains in larger urban areas (see Costa and Kahn, 2000 for a convincing account of at least 
one potential source for such gains). Dynamic agglomeration economies are another possible 
explanation. Theory tells us that in an unregulated and unconstrained world, population density would 
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 be a positive function of city size. Indeed population or employment density have been used in the 
literature as variables to proxy for potential agglomeration economies. But there are severe regulatory 
constraints applied in Europe influencing population density independently of city size. Rigid urban 
containment policies have, for example, been applied in the UK since 1947 and other countries, such as 
the Netherlands, have policies for ‘urban densification’. So initial population density was included to 
capture such impacts. Once agglomeration economies are controlled for with city size, cities with higher 
density will have higher costs of space and greater congestion. A negative relationship is expected. In 
our judgement, the main source of variation in initial population density is likely to be differences in the 
constraint on urban land supply variations in land use regulation impose. Higher density, other things 
equal, signals a tighter constraint imposed on development. Topography and the inertia of inheritance 
embodied in the built environment no doubt contribute to differences in densities but probably less than 
land use policy which varies substantially both across countries and between cities (for recent evidence, 




The results for the base models are shown in Tables 2a & b which also report diagnostic statistics. All 
variables are significant and have the expected sign and the adjusted R2 is 0.56. Test statistics for the 
OLS model are generally satisfactory except those for spatial dependence. Table 2b reports the results of 
including a spatial lag. The results are effectively unchanged except that test results for spatial 
dependence are now satisfactory. 
 
4.2 Testing Hypotheses 
We then include independent variables designed to test our hypotheses. The theoretical reasons for 
expecting a concentration of R&D activity and highly skilled human capital to have a positive impact on 
local economic growth follow the analysis of Romer (1990) adapted to a spatial context (see Magrini, 
1998). An extensive literature on the role of human capital in economic growth and the tendency for 
innovation to be localised with respect to R&D has developed over the past ten years, so little 
justification seems necessary. They are reflected here by two variables. One used in previous work is the 
concentration of the R&D facilities of large companies relative to population in each FUR. For some 
recent evidence on the spatial diffusion of innovation see Barrios et al, 2007. The second is a new 
variable, university students per employee.  Both these variables are measured for the start of the period 
to minimise problems of endogeneity. 
 
Our next hypothesis is that there is a relationship between systems of city government and city growth 
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 performance: specifically that the more closely the administrative and functional boundaries of a city-
region correspond, the more likely it will be that effective local growth promotion policies develop. We 
conceive of ‘growth promotion policies’ in a much broader sense than as policies just designed to attract 
mobile investment. We would count as growth promotion policies: efficient public administration, 
reducing uncertainty and making decisions transparently and quickly; providing relevant infrastructure; 
more effective co-ordination between public and private investment; providing relevant and effective 
training; and ensuring that land use policies are flexible and co-ordinated with infrastructure provision 
and the demands of private sector investors. They could also involve giving a higher priority to output 
and productivity growth compared to equity or environmental outcomes.  
 
More effective local growth promotion policies may not involve spending more, even on infrastructure, 
so a simple measure of local public expenditure is unlikely to capture the efficacy of growth promotion 
efforts even were such a variable available. Grand projects such as Bilbao’s Guggenheim museum, 
London’s Millennium Dome or a trophy metro system in Toulouse, are expensive but not necessarily 
productive; efficient public administration and rapid public decision-making, clearly defined land use 
policies and infrastructure planning, may cost less than their inefficient alternatives. 
 
Any ‘output’ of such policies – extra growth – is a local quasi-public good. It will be hard to exclude 
non-contributing agents from any benefits policies generate: if policies paid for and implemented by the 
central city of a FUR increase output growth in its territory, it will be impossible to exclude commuters 
from surrounding jurisdictions from sharing the benefits, even though they pay no taxes within the 
central city. There will also be a zero opportunity cost in ‘consumption’ of any dividends the policy 
yields: if your rents rise, so do mine and that is not a cost to me; if your employment opportunities 
improve that, too, is not a cost to mine. There is thus a classic problem of market failure so local growth 
promotion polices will be likely to be produced by government or some ‘club’ of actors, usually local 
and regional governments and private sector agencies in a public-private partnership. Such clubs face 
varying problems of spillover losses and transaction costs. A proportion of the growth gains will leak 
out to agencies or residents of surrounding jurisdictions who are not members of the ‘growth promotion 
club’. The relative size of such ‘leaks’ will vary with the size of the area the ‘club’ represents relative to 
that of the whole FUR (which, as discussed, maximises the proportion of the benefits retained). The 
closer the coincidence in the boundaries of the governmental unit within which such policies are 
pursued with those of the economic region/FUR within which their impact is largely contained, the 
proportionately less will be these spillovers. In addition, the larger is the central unit of government 
relative to the size of the self-contained FUR, the lower are likely to be the transactions costs in building 
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 a ‘growth promotion’ club8. 
 
Any FUR is composed of one or more jurisdictions so a ‘club’ of jurisdictions (also usually including 
private sector actors) will have to be formed to implement growth promotion policies: in essence that is 
what regional development agencies are. If a ‘club’ forms it is reasonable to assume that the largest 
jurisdiction within the FUR will always be a member. In our data set the largest jurisdiction in all FURs 
represents the historically oldest and central jurisdiction of the core or, in some cases, the whole core 
city. The larger this is relative to the other jurisdictions within the FUR, the more dominant it is likely to 
be and the more clout it will have; so the larger is the central jurisdiction relative to the FUR as a whole, 
the lower are transactions costs likely to be. Whether an effective growth promotion club is formed for a 
city-region is not, therefore, inevitable but will be conditioned primarily on the structure of the 
incentives faced by these governmental and other economic actors who might form a ‘growth promotion 
club’.  
 
Even if expenditures are very imperfectly related to outcomes, growth promotion policies cost resources 
and there will be transactions costs in forming and maintaining an effective club. The expected growth 
gains any club might achieve will vary with local circumstances and existing policies. The club’s 
expected gross payoff will be a direct function of the additional growth that a given club expects it can 
generate. Since a FUR’s boundaries contain the maximum proportion of such benefits as might be 
generated by local growth promotion policies, for a given potential gross growth gain, the expected 
payoff for any growth club will fall as the size of its jurisdiction/territory falls in relation to that of the 
relevant FUR because the spillover losses to areas of the FUR not represented in the club increase. 
Equally, assuming other factors are constant, the expected net payoff would fall as the transactions costs 
incurred to form the club increase. Transactions costs will be positively related to the number of relevant 
potential members and the institutional dominance of the lead actor (which we can assume will be a 
governmental unit). Thus other things equal, expected net benefits will increase and transactions costs 
fall as the size of the largest effective governmental unit increases relative to the size of the FUR.  
 
Arguments such as these led Cheshire and Gordon (1996, page 389) to conclude that growth promotion 
policies would be more likely to appear and be more energetically pursued where ‘there are a smaller 
                                                 
8 This may be somewhat simplified. There may be political or cultural links between some cities which are strong enough 
to lend some sense of joint enterprise to development efforts. Glaswegians may be happier with the thought of residents 
of Edinburgh sharing in their growth gains than might be the case, for example, between the citizens of Brussels and 
Antwerp. But even to the extent that this is true it might be regarded simply as statistically random noise and so not bias 
our proposed measure. 
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 number of public agencies representing the functional economic region, with the boundaries of the 
highest tier authority approximating to those of the region…’. 
 
We can specify a variable closely reflecting this feature of FURs: the ratio of the total population of the 
largest (relevant) jurisdiction representing the FUR to the population of the FUR as a whole. This will 
normally be the jurisdiction with the largest population, representing the central administrative unit of 
the FUR, but this is qualified by ‘relevant’: the jurisdiction must have significant powers of action. 
Given the abolition of the Greater London Council in mid-period, the largest NUTS region with a 
territory overlapping that of the London FUR during the period of our analysis was the South East 
Region. But this was not a ‘relevant’ jurisdiction because it had essentially no powers9. The rules by 
which such ‘relevant’ local government units were identified were established before any models were 
estimated so that the variable could be defined blind of the data. These rules are set out in Appendix 1 
and necessarily varied from country to country since the powers and structure of local governments vary 
widely across the EU. 
 
We call this the ‘policy incentive’ variable because it is designed to measure the incentive to implement 
policies promoting growth at the FUR level. Since one criterion used to select the ‘relevant’ 
governmental unit for each FUR was that it should have significant administrative and decision making 
powers, the Level 1 regions were potentially available for selection in countries with a regional level of 
government. In practice, this meant that the value of the variable could range from only about 0.125 (in 
France) to over 2 (in Spain). We might further hypothesise that if the value of the variable were very 
high, so that the size of the ‘relevant’ unit of government substantially exceeded the size of the FUR, 
then the incentive to generate growth promoting policies for the FUR might weaken. The interests of the 
FUR would begin to be lost in those of the larger unit which might favour rural areas or smaller centres. 
As an illustration one might contrast Madrid, where the boundaries of the powerful regional government 
are only a little larger than those of the FUR with Aviles/Gijon in Asturias. There the region is very 
much bigger than the FUR of Aviles/Gijon and contains the smaller independent FUR of Oviedo. 
Oviedo is not large enough to be in our data set but is the regional centre of government for Asturias. 
Thus the growth policies of Aviles/Gijon might actually suffer from the much larger size of the regional 
jurisdiction containing it. This would imply a quadratic functional form with a maximum positive 
impact for the policy incentive variable where the value was between 1 and 2.  
 
                                                 
9 During the period analysed there was a South East Regional Planning Council (SERPLAN) but this was effectively no 
more than a forum for discussion. 
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Table 3 shows the results of adding variables to our ‘base’ model. Model 2 is directly comparable with 
the OLS model reported in Table 2a but includes the additional variables to test the hypotheses 
described above. The policy incentive variable is included in quadratic form but although the variable is 
significant the squared term is not. The variables measuring R&D activity and highly skilled human 
capital are highly significant and the overall adjusted R2 rises from 0.56 to 0.64. Full results of other 
models (for example, including the policy incentive in linear form and/or a spatial lag) are available 
from the authors but the essential results are unchanged. 
 
 
Table 4 gives test statistics, including tests for spatial dependence. Two significant points emerge. The 
first is that there are no signs of classic econometric problems – multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity or 
non-normality of errors. Spatial dependence is a potential problem, however. As is well known, a key 
issue in testing for spatial dependence is the specification of the ‘proximity’ of one observation to 
another. There is no a priori basis for selecting distance weights. As is often the reality with applied 
work, insight and experimentation are complementary. Our insight grew with experiment and tests were 
conducted using 28 different distance weight matrices, applying all the distance measures found in the 
literature, including contiguity, crow-fly distance and road distance, in various formulations. Here, we 
report only the results for distance measures which seem most reasonably to represent underlying spatial 
processes and which also induced the most measured sensitivity to spatial dependence.  
 
Test statistic values for spatial dependence were highly sensitive to how distance was measured. We 
could easily ‘eliminate’ indications of spatial dependence by just choosing a suitable measure of 
‘proximity’. This, in itself, should be a warning but it suggested that a useful indicator of how to test for 
spatial dependence most rigorously was that the proximity measure made economic sense and indicated 
the greatest problems, or most frequently indicated problems, of spatial dependence. Happily, measuring 
distance as the inverse of time-distance between FURs, using the standard road freight software, 
including ferry crossings, not only seems to represent ‘proximity’ in an economically meaningful way 
but also always provided the greatest measured sensitivity to spatial dependence. Table 4 reports results 
for two formulations – the inverse of time-distance and the inverse of time-distance squared.  
 
From the bottom panel of Table 4, relating to Model 2, we find only minor indications of spatial 
dependence. Results for our preferred measure of proximity are perfectly acceptable for two 
recommended test statistics, LM (error) and LM (lag), although the value of the Moran’s I is suspect at 
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 10 percent. Cheshire and Magrini (2006) found that there was quality of life associated adjustment 
within but not between countries. The implication was that national borders represented substantial 
barriers to spatial adjustment. This prompted us to include in the spatial weights matrix an additional 
‘time-distance penalty’ for national borders. Here we have systematically tested border time-distance 
penalties from zero to infinity. The results were generally most sensitive to spatial dependence if 
national borders were represented as an additional time-distance of 600 minutes. The test statistics for 
Model 2 illustrate this clearly. With that time penalty added to the distance weights matrix the key test 
statistics for spatial dependence are significant. If an infinite time-distance penalty is imposed for 
national borders then implied problems of spatial dependence are reduced. This implies that if ‘distance’ 
between FURs is represented in the most economically meaningful way, Model 2 really embodies 
problems of spatial dependence. 
 
We interpret these test results as indicating an underlying problem of omitted variables. We should not 
expect the growth behaviour of a FUR to be independent of its neighbours; nor should we be surprised 
to discover that there are systematic differences in urban growth performance resulting from location. 
 
Our final set of variables is designed to test these explanations and further illuminate the drivers of 
differential urban economic growth rates. It has long been argued that location within Europe should 
have systematic effects on patterns of spatial growth. From at least the contribution of Clark et al. 
(1969) there has been a powerful argument that the process of European integration systematically 
favoured ‘core regions’ – those gaining most in terms of economic accessibility, the more centrally 
located. This provided the intellectual support for EU policies to reduce spatial disparities and develop 
stronger instruments of regional development as a complement to steps towards integration. More 
recently, ‘New Economic Geography’ has produced formal models with essentially the same 
conclusions (see Fujita et al., 1999, for a survey).  
 
An early empirical attempt to estimate the spatial economic effects of European integration was the 
influential work of Clark et al. (1969). Using GDP data they estimated themselves for all regions for the 
years 1960-64, Clarke et al (1969) estimated regional ‘economic potential’10 for the six original 
members of the EEC and the then four candidate members, for three alternative states of the world: with 
tariffs at pre-Treaty of Rome levels; with all 10 countries having no tariffs on manufactures; and with no 
tariffs and two transport improvements – containerisation and roll-on roll-off ferries. Thus the change in 
                                                 
10 The concept of ‘economic potential’ is an old measure dating from the work of Harris (1954) and measures the 
accessibility to income (in Clark et al. measured as total GDP) at every point in space allowing for full costs of transport 
including, where appropriate, tariffs. 
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 economic potential for each region associated with the reduction of trade and transport costs to be 
brought about by European integration and anticipated technical progress provided a measure of these 
systematic spatial economic impacts. The ‘integration gain’ variable used here is taken directly from 
Clark et als’ values, supplemented with the estimates for the regions of Spain and Portugal provided by 
Keeble et al. (1988), scaled to Clark et als’ values. Values for Athens, Lisbon, Porto and Saliniki were 
interpolated to provide coverage of all the major FURs of the EU of 12. Since our interest is in growth, 
we use the change in the values of ‘economic potential’ from the pre-Treaty of Rome values to those 
estimated as being associated with an elimination of tariffs, the EU’s enlargement of the 1980s and a 
reduction in transport costs following the introduction of roll-on roll-off ferries and containerisation. The 
theoretical arguments as to why integration should favour core regions do not imply that the relationship 
measured for the 1980s or the 1990s should necessarily be linear but experimentation suggested the 
linear form reported here performed best in statistical terms. 
 
As an additional variable to account for systematic spatial patterns in growth we include a 
straightforward dummy for peripherality. There has been much discussion in the literature of the impact 
of peripherality. The ‘integration gain’ variable already accounts for the systematic effects of European 
integration but peripheral regions may have common features (such as lower factor costs, for example). 
More obviously, they have been recipients of regional aid from the EU. Although the impact of such aid 
has been questioned (Midelfart and Overman, 2002, or Rodriguez-Pose and Fratesi, 2004) still it is 
unlikely to have been systematically negative. To avoid subjective judgements about what regions are – 
or are not – peripheral, this is formulated simply in terms of time-distance from Brussels: any FUR 600 
minutes or more from Brussels is classified as peripheral.  
 
Models 3 and 4 (see Table 3) include these variables. It will be seen that both are significant. There is an 
apparent systematic integration gain effect. Perhaps more interesting is the fact that the peripherality 
dummy is not only significant but also positively signed. Offsetting for all other variables, including the 
direct effects of ‘integration gain’, FURs more than 600 minutes from Brussels experienced faster 
growth in GDP p.c. than those nearer. Neither of these variables raises any significant endogeneity 
concerns. 
 
Models 3 and 4 also include three variables (plus an additional control for the initial level of 
unemployment11) designed to reflect more localised spatial patterns of urban growth resulting from the 
                                                 




 influence of conditions in one city on the growth performance of its neighbour(s). Systematic 
interactions between FURs’ growth rates should decline with distance between them. In regions of 
dense urbanisation, such as the German Ruhr, Benelux countries, the British midlands or northern Italy, 
one would expect the economic development of urban regions to be highly interdependent. The most 
obvious reason is the literature on labour market search behaviour and vacancy chains. If productivity, 
wages or job opportunities are relatively improving in one FUR, then economically active non-residents 
who can access those opportunities at the lowest cost – who live nearest – will tend to do so. Migration 
is expensive but changes in commuting patterns respond to only small differences in opportunities 
(Gordon and Lamont, 1982 or Morrison, 2006). These variables are all measured as densities across the 
set of neighbouring FURs. In calculating the value of each density variable for any FURi the weight 
attached to the value of the variable in surrounding FURj-n is discounted by the inverse of time-distance 
(with the same 600 minute time-distance penalty for national borders as maximised the value of spatial 
dependence and an upper limit on time-distance to identify the members off the set FURj-n). This upper 
limit was determined for each density variable by experiment but the results seem reasonable in terms of 
economic behaviour. In all cases, the selected cut-offs worked best in an empirical sense: in the case of 
formulating the distance weights matrix to test for spatial dependence, they tended to produce the 
greatest sensitivity to tests; in formulating the density variables to represent spatial adjustment 
processes, they produced the best results, both in terms of significance and eliminating indications of 
spatial dependence. 
 
The first is the spatial density of unemployment. If a FUR’s growth rate is negatively influenced by a 
concentration of unemployment in it at the start of the period, then a concentration of unemployment in 
closely surrounding FURs should also have a negative impact. Given the possibility of job search in 
surrounding areas we would expect higher unemployment not to be just localised, moreover, but if 
neighbouring FUR labour markets are accessible, we would expect unemployment rates for workers of 
comparable skills to even out over the set of neighbouring FURs. Since job search areas and commuting 
distances of the less skilled (over-represented among the unemployed) are relatively shorter, we should 
also expect the influence of localised unemployment to be relatively short range and experiment showed 
the best results were obtained applying a two hour time-distance to identify ‘neighbouring’ FURs. 
 
As with job search, the literature on the spatial pattern of innovation shows a distance decay effect, with 
patents tending to be applied more frequently nearer to their point of origin. So, the impact of R&D with 
respect to innovation is likely not to be purely localised but to be subject to a distance decay effect 
(Audretsch, 1998; Barrios et al, 2007). So R&D in one urban area should have some positive differential 
impact on innovation and growth in neighbouring urban areas but that effect would diminish with 
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 distance. An upper time-distance of 2.5 hours between FUR centroids to identify ‘neighbouring’ FURs 
worked best. This gives us our second spatial adjustment variable. 
 
The third of these variables is the relative concentration of university students in neighbouring FURs at 
the start of the period. An initially higher stock of university students within a given FUR directly 
increases its growth performance (captured in our ‘University Student’ variable). Furthermore, this 
additional growth will increase relative job opportunities and tend to suck in complementary labour, 
including high human capital labour, from surrounding FURs. Consequently, we expect a negative 
impact on growth in a particular FUR of a stronger relative concentration of university students at the 
start of the period in neighbouring FURs; moreover, we also expect the distance over which such an 
effect would be measured to be longer than with unemployment. As with the spatial effects of R&D 
concentration, the best results were obtained if the cut off was set at 2.5 hours, to which was again added 
a 600-minute national border time-distance penalty. 
 
The results of including these variables to reflect systematic spatial patterns in FUR growth and spatial 
adjustment mechanisms between neighbouring FURs are set out in the final two columns of Table 3, 
with the relevant diagnostic statistics in Table 4. The results for our ‘policy incentive’ variable are 
significant although the squared term is still not well defined - only significant at 10 percent. 
Nevertheless, an F test shows that a quadratic functional form is significantly better at the 5 percent 
level. All other variables are significant at 5 percent and have the expected signs.  
 
The regression diagnostics indicate that there are none of the common econometric problems of cross 
sectional models. More interestingly, including the spatial variables eliminates any sign of spatial 
dependence. This supports our view that finding spatial dependence frequently derives from omitting 
variables. We have formulated variables designed to measure factors leading to systematic spatial 
patterns in growth performance and interaction between neighbouring FURs and they are not only 
statistically significant but eliminate all indications of spatial dependence. This suggests we should now 
not only have consistent parameter estimates but better analytical insight into the drivers of urban 
economic growth including how mechanisms of spatial adjustment modify growth performance in areas 
of denser urbanisation. 
 
 
Finally Table 5 shows the impact on growth performance of a change of one standard deviation in each 
independent variable. Perhaps unsurprisingly the single greatest influence is the performance of the 
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 economy outside the area of the major FURs. But other variables have substantial influence particularly 
when taken in groups of related variables such as those reflecting concentrations of R&D and highly 
skilled human capital or those relating to systematic spatial patterns and spatial interactions in densely 
urbanised areas of Europe. 
 
5. Conclusions 
One conclusion is, therefore, that by including variables reflecting theoretically relevant spatial 
adjustment mechanisms it is possible effectively to eliminate problems of spatial dependence. So, a 
finding of spatial dependence – at least in the context of recent patterns of European urban growth – 
largely reflects model specification. If theoretically appropriate variables reflecting spatial processes are 
included, spatial dependence is eliminated. Testing for spatial dependence is itself, however, very 
demanding. It was only when we realised the barrier that national borders represented for labour 
mobility (Cheshire and Magrini, 2006) and experimented with time penalties for national borders in the 
distance weights matrix, that tests revealed any problems of spatial dependence in our models of GDP 
p.c. growth.  
 
Models 3 and 4 should provide consistent estimates and support the interpretation that they are a 
sufficiently good approximation of the underlying economic processes which generated our dependent 
variable, FUR growth rates in real GDP p.c., to provide insight into causal processes – so we can 
conclude that the evidence supports the main hypotheses summarised in the introduction:  
1. Local differences in human capital and R&D activity are important factors in explaining 
differential rates of urban economic growth; 
2. European integration has had a significant impact in accelerating growth in regions gaining most 
in terms of economic potential – mainly ‘core’ regions – but at the same time, offsetting for all 
other factors including these systematic impacts of integration itself, peripheral regions, on 
average, grew faster relative to the rest; and 
3. Administrative and government arrangements for cities systematically influence their economic 
growth performance. Where there is a jurisdiction approximating the boundaries of an 
economically self-contained city-region, growth is stronger, other things equal. This is consistent 
with the expectations conceptualising the promotion of growth as the provision of a local public 
good and the resulting advantage in forming an effective ‘growth promotion club’ of local actors 
since spillover losses and transactions costs are minimised. 
 
We stress that policies encouraging local economic growth are not conceived as being just geared to 
inward investment nor even, necessarily, with explicitly promoting growth at all. They may consist of 
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 efficient local public administration, avoidance of waste and a focus on activities that government at an 
urban level can effectively influence, such as the supply of skills or infrastructure, rather than 
redistribution. We cannot measure these factors comparably across the urban areas of the EU as a 
whole. The variable used in the present paper seems justified on theoretical grounds but is an indirect 
measure, reflecting not the policies themselves, but the incentive and capacity to generate such policies 
faced by local actors. This variable is significant even in a very simple model but more fully specified 
models and further testing confirms its statistical significance and suggests a quadratic functional form. 
So, for growth promotion, the optimal size of government areas associated with city-regions is perhaps a 
little larger than the area covered by the functional economic boundaries. 
 
The results also support the conclusion of Cheshire and Magrini (2006) that an assumption of ‘full 
spatial equilibrium’ is not appropriate in Europe with its geographically immobile population. Moreover 
it also implies it is inappropriate to argue there is one unified European urban system. National borders 
still represent significant obstacles. We only observe indications of spatial dependence if a substantial, 
600-minute, time-distance penalty is added where FURs are separated by national boundaries. A 
comparable effect is revealed in specifying variables to reflect process of spatial interaction between 
geographically neighbouring cities. Conditions in cities geographically close to each other – common in 
densely urbanised Europe – do significantly influence economic growth patterns in each other: but not if 
they are separated by a national border. Borders seem, for example, to eliminate the tendency for 
innovations to be localised. The nature of our methodology, of course, does not allow us to discriminate 
so that is consistent with the barrier represented by a national border being greater in some contexts and 
less in others. The results, therefore, lend further support to the conclusion that in a European context of 
restricted labour mobility and continuing national border effects, income growth rather than population 
growth is a more appropriate indicator of welfare improvements in a city.  
 
The empirical results also provide support for the theoretical work of Magrini (1998) on the significant 
role of human capital in regional economic growth. In models investigating urban population growth 
neither concentrations of highly skilled nor of R&D establishments had any influence (Cheshire and 
Magrini, 2006). As drivers of economic growth we find they are highly significant.  It may be stretching 
our results rather far but this is consistent with self selection in migration with less productive workers 
more influenced by climate (not significant in explaining difference in rates of economic growth) in 
choosing where to live and the highly skilled by wages and employment opportunities. The results also 
provide indirect evidence supporting the increased importance of agglomeration economies since the 
late 1970s and the negative impact on economic performance of increasing urban density. There was a 
systematic tendency for larger cities to have a faster rate of economic growth but a negative effect – 
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 once size and other factors were allowed for – of density. This is interesting in the debate about the 
sources of agglomeration economies since it implies that it is not density per se that is conduce to 
agglomeration economies but opportunities for productive interactions. While density rises with city 
size it is a negative since it reduces the propensity for productive interactions other things equal by 
raising congestion and the price of space. 
 
The results do not identify strong policy levers with which to boost a city’s rate of growth. It does not 
follow, for example, that if in the late 1970s every city had been endowed with the same proportion of 
university students per employee they would all have grown at the same rate as the actually best 
endowed with universities did. While these differences were one factor in explaining growth differences 
– and that helps understand what was going on – there is no necessary symmetry about the impact of 
giving all cities the same sized relative university sectors. It is probable that the unobserved 
characteristics of the cities with the highest ratios of university students were, and still are, different in 
important ways from cities with the lowest ratios; and were not independent of the concentration of 
universities in them. Nor is it possible to think in practical terms of providing all cities with equally high 
ratios of university students per employee and maintaining a constant quality of university students (and 
students who then disproportionately join the local labour force).  
 
It is perhaps more plausible to think of the findings on the policy incentive variable as identifying a 
‘policy lever’. Local and regional government boundaries and functions could be restructured and, if an 
important element of the disadvantage FURs with fragmented local government structures face in 
effectively promoting growth, results from spillovers and transaction costs, the outcome should be more 
effective policies all round. A problem is that, of course, ‘effective’ local growth promotion policies at 
present, in circumstances in which not all city regions are equally well endowed with the incentive to 
develop them, may be significantly competitive and diversionary. Some local growth may be zero sum. 
The success of cities endowed with beneficial systems of government may significantly be a function of 
the poor performance of those less favourably placed. It does not follow that all policies designed to 
promote local growth are zero sum, however. It is reasonable to expect that there could be net efficiency 
gains for the EU’s urban system as a whole if city government boundaries were aligned more closely 
with those reflecting economically relevant patterns of behaviour and spatial economic organisation.  
 
This also should remind us of the limitations of the Tiebout hypothesis (1956). That is an important and 
influential idea but it is elaborated in a world in which local public policies have no spillovers beyond 
the jurisdiction in which they are implemented and people are perfectly mobile. 
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Table 1: Variable Definitions 
No Variable Name Description 
 Constant  
1 Population Size Population size in 1979 (natural logarithm) 
Population Density Density of population in FUR in 1979 (1000 inhabitants/Km2) 2 
3 Coalfield: core Dummy = 1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
4 Coalfield: hinterland Dummy = 1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located in a coalfield 
5 Port Size * Volume of port trade in 1969 (100 tons) 
6 Agriculture * Proportionate share of labour force in agriculture in surrounding NUTS 2 in 1975 
7 Unemployment * Unemployment rate (average as proportion of LF between 1977 and 1981)
National Non-FUR Growth Growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each country outside the major FURs (annualised rate between 1978/80 and 1992/94) 8 
Policy Incentive * Ratio of the population of the largest governmental unit associated with the FUR to that of the FUR in 1981 9 
10 Integration Gain Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from pre-Treaty of Rome EEC to post enlargement EU with reduced transport costs normalised. 
11 Peripherality  Dummy = 1 if the FUR is more than 10 hours away from Brussels 
12 University Students * Ratio of university students (1977-78) to total employment (1979) 
13 R&D Facilities * R&D laboratories of Fortune 500 companies per 1000 inhabitants in 1980 
Unemployment Density  
Sum of differences between the unemployment (average as proportion of 
LF between 1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in neighbouring FURs 
(within 2 hours), discounted by distance (with 10 hours time penalty for 
national borders) 
14 
Sum of university students per employees in neighbouring FURs (within 
2.5 hours), discounted by distance (with 10 hours time penalty for national 
borders) 
15 University Students Density 
Sum of R&D laboratories per 1000 inhabitants in neighbouring FURs 
(within 2.5 hours), discounted by distance (with 10 hours time penalty for 
national borders) 
16 R&D Facilities Density 
Note: * denotes variables tried with a quadratic specification for reasons explained in the text: never entered as 
squared value alone.  
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 Table 2a: Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: Base Model  
R2 0.5903 Regression Diagnostics 
Adjusted R2 0.5570 Multicollinearity 
LIK 485.56 Condition Number 67.27   
  Normality of Errors DF value prob 
Constant -0.0205 Jarque-Bera 2 1.6276 0.44 
t-test  -  prob -2.05 0.04 Heteroskedasticity DF Value Prob 
National Non-FUR Growth 0.8600 Breusch-Pagan test 9 5.9155 0.75 
t-test  -  prob 8.06 0.00 Spatial Dependence MI/DF value prob 
Coalfield: core -0.0054 weight matrix 600_1   
t-test  -  prob -4.25 0.00 Moran's I (error) 0.0473 3.5250 0.00 
Coalfield: hinterland -0.0057 Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 3.8883 0.05 
t-test  -  prob -3.29 0.00 Robust LM (error) 1 0.5522 0.46 
Port Size -0.1364 Kelejian-Robinson (error) 10 1.7005 1.00 
t-test  -  prob -3.18 0.00 Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 4.2253 0.04 
Port Size squared 0.6166 Robust LM (lag) 1 0.8896 0.35 
t-test  -  prob 2.28 0.02 weight matrix 600_2   
Agriculture 0.0409 Moran's I (error) 0.0954 2.2077 0.03 
t-test  -  prob 2.55 0.01 Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 2.6838 0.10 
Agriculture squared -0.1125 Robust LM (error) 1 0.5048 0.48 
t-test  -  prob -2.51 0.01 Kelejian-Robinson (error) 10 1.7005 1.00 
Population Size 0.0021 Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 6.9056 0.01 
t-test  -  prob 3.16 0.00 Robust LM (lag) 1 4.7266 0.03 
Population Density -0.0015     
t-test  -  prob -2.00 0.05     
Note: weight matrices are calculated as the inverse of time distance; the first 3 characters describe the size of the time 
penalty for national borders; the last digit reports the power of the inverse function. 
 
Table 2b:  Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to mean 
1992/4: Base Model with Spatial Lag (Maximum Likelihood estimate) 
R2 0.6053 Regression Diagnostics 
LIK 488.74 Heteroskedasticity  DF value prob 
  Breusch-Pagan test 9 5.0579 0.83 
Constant -0.0240 Spatial Breusch-Pagan test 9 5.0583 0.83 
t-test  -  prob -2.55 0.01 Spatial Dependence DF value prob 
Spatial Lag of dep. variable 0.2648 weight matrix 600_2   
t-test  -  prob 2.61 0.01 Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 1.0500 0.31 
National Non-FUR Growth 0.7119     
t-test  -  prob 6.24 0.00     
Coalfield: core -0.0050     
t-test  -  prob -4.13 0.00     
Coalfield: hinterland -0.0054     
t-test  -  prob -3.37 0.00     
Port Size -0.1416     
t-test  -  prob -3.56 0.00     
Port Size squared 0.6550     
t-test  -  prob 2.61 0.01     
Agriculture 0.0254     
t-test  -  prob 1.67 0.10     
Agriculture squared -0.0737     
t-test  -  prob -1.75 0.08     
Population Size 0.0019     
t-test  -  prob 3.11 0.00     
Population Density -0.0015     





Table 3: Dependent Variable Annualised Rate of Growth of GDP p.c. Mean 1978/80 to 
mean 1992/4 – Models excluding and including ‘Spatial Variables’ 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
R2 0.6765 0.7413 0.7555 
Adjusted R2 0.6372 0.6986 0.7095 
LIK 499.86 513.38 516.80 
    
Constant -0.0320 -0.0233 -0.0261 
t-test  -  prob -3.14 0.00 -3.52   0.01 -2.84 0.01 
National Non-FUR Growth 0.9442 0.8975 0.9050 
t-test  -  prob 9.22   0.00 9.07   0.00 9.31 0.00 
Coalfield: core -0.0062 -0.0051 -0.0051 
t-test  -  prob -5.18   0.00 -3.99   0.00 -4.00 0.00 
Coalfield: hinterland -0.0042 -0.0034 -0.0032 
t-test  -  prob -2.61   0.01 -2.23   0.03 -2.06 0.04 
Port Size -0.1474 -0.1003 -0.0932 
t-test  -  prob -3.69   0.00 -2.62   0.01 -2.46 0.02 
Port Size squared 0.7634 0.4871 0.4669 
t-test  -  prob 3.04   0.00 2.02   0.05 1.97 0.05 
Agriculture 0.0508 0.0384 0.0478 
t-test  -  prob 3.22   0.00 2.48    0.01 3.02 0.00 
Agriculture squared -0.1345 -0.1126 -0.1231 
t-test  -  prob -3.21   0.00 -2.82   0.01 -3.12 0.00 
Unemployment  -0.0332 -0.0312 
t-test  -  prob  -2.45   0.02 -2.29 0.02 
Population Size 0.0021 0.0016 0.0016 
t-test  -  prob 3.53   0.00 2.90   0.00 2.87 0.01 
Population Density -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0013 
t-test  -  prob -2.25   0.03 -2.36   0.02 -2.07 0.04 
Integration Gain  0.0073 0.0082 
t-test  -  prob  3.20   0.00 3.61 0.00 
University Students 0.0309 0.0367 0.0303 
t-test  -  prob 2.67   0.01 3.62   0.00 2.87 0.01 
R&D Facilities 0.8079 0.8947 0.8512 
t-test  -  prob 2.84   0.01 3.26   0.00 3.10 0.00 
Policy Incentive 0.0075 0.0026 0.0086 a
t-test  -  prob 2.24   0.03 2.45   0.02 2.49 0.01 
Policy Incentive squared -0.0021  -0.0027 a
t-test  -  prob -1.32   0.19  -1.72 0.09 
R&D Facilities Density  0.0531 0.0703 
t-test  -  prob  2.19   0.03 2.70 0.01 
Peripherality   0.0059 0.0054 
t-test  -  prob  4.51   0.00 4.10 0.00 
University Students Density  -0.0025 -0.0030 
t-test  -  prob  -2.46   0.02 -2.93 0.00 
Unemployment Density   -0.0036 
t-test  -  prob   -1.92 0.06 
Note: a  Test of joint significance: χ2(2) = 10.4333 (0.01). 
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Table 4: Regression diagnostics for spatial dependence 
Regression Diagnostics  Model 2   Model 3   Model 4  
Multicollinearity          
Condition Number 80.61   98.80   100.76   
Normality of Errors DF value prob DF value prob DF value prob 
Jarque-Bera 2 3.3273 0.19 2 0.4241 0.81 2 1.3092 0.52 
Heteroskedasticity DF value prob DF value prob DF value prob 
Breusch-Pagan test 13 19.3825 0.11 17 19.5586 0.30 19 20.6820 0.35 
Spatial Dependence MI/DF value prob DF value prob DF value prob 
weight m  atrix nf_1i          
Moran's I (error) 0.0434 1.8729 0.06 -0.0579 -0.3974 0.69 -0.0486 -0.1666 0.87 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 0.9212 0.34 1 1.6391 0.20 1 1.1546 0.28 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 6.6183 0.01 1 1.0262 0.31 1 1.3544 0.24 
weight m  atrix nf_2i          
Moran's I (error) 0.0559 1.4068 0.16 -0.0693 -0.2919 0.77 -0.0622 -0.2051 0.84 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 0.6996 0.40 1 1.0746 0.30 1 0.8658 0.35 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 7.1177 0.01 1 1.4014 0.24 1 1.8558 0.17 
weight matrix 600_1         
Moran's I (error) 0.0303 2.8693 0.00 -0.0168 0.6264 0.53 -0.0157 0.6486 0.52 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 1.5984 0.21 1 0.4929 0.48 1 0.4311 0.51 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 5.8394 0.02 1 0.5179 0.47 1 0.8431 0.36 
weight matrix 600_2         
Moran's I (error) 0.0662 1.7888 0.07 -0.0381 0.1429 0.89 -0.0367 0.1314 0.90 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 1.3233 0.25 1 0.4378 0.51 1 0.4074 0.52 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 7.1366 0.01 1 1.1324 0.29 1 1.4065 0.24 
weight matrix 000_1         
Moran's I (error) 0.0143 2.3972 0.02 -0.0169 0.3574 0.72 -0.0160 0.3824 0.70 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 0.5553 0.46 1 0.7746 0.38 1 0.6966 0.40 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 2.4908 0.11 1 0.0516 0.82 1 0.3381 0.56 
weight matrix 000_2         
Moran's I (error) 0.0573 1.7963 0.07 -0.0291 0.1811 0.86 -0.0304 0.1068 0.91 
Lagrange Multiplier (error) 1 0.0304 0.86 1 0.3489 0.55 1 0.3824 0.54 
Lagrange Multiplier (lag) 1 1.5536 0.21 1 0.0370 0.85 1 0.1366 0.71 
Note: weight matrices are calculated as the inverse of time distance; the first 3 characters describe the size of the time penalty for national borders; the last digit reports the power of 
the inverse function. 
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Table 5:  Growth Impact: effect on predicted growth of a change (+ or - 1sd) of an 
independent variable  
 GROWTH IMPACT 
 Model 4 
+ 1 std - 1 std  
Population Size 1.81% -1.81% 
Population Density  -1.34% 1.34% 
Coalfield: core -3.06% 3.06% 
Coalfield: hinterland -1.29% 1.29% 
Port Size * -2.68% 3.40% 
Agriculture * 3.74% -5.57% 
Unemployment  -1.70% 1.70% 
National Non-FUR Growth 6.18% -6.18% 
Policy Incentive * 2.24% -2.24% 
Integration Gain 2.97% -4.13% 
Peripherality  2.91% -2.91% 
University Students 3.36% -3.36% 
R&D Facilities 1.92% -1.92% 
Unemployment Density -1.26% 1.26% 
University Students Density -2.69% 2.69% 
R&D Facilities Density 4.16% -4.16% 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions and data 
 
Appendix 1 Table 1: The dependent variable was in all cases the annualised rate of FUR growth in 
estimated GDP p.c. converted at OECD PPS. Growth measured between means of 1978/80 and 
1992/94 and estimated from Eurostat NUTS 3 and national data as described in text 
No Variable Name Description 
 Constant  
1 Population Size Population size in 1979 (natural logarithm) 
Population Density Density of population in FUR in 1979 (1000 inhabitants/Km2) 2 
3 Coalfield: core Dummy = 1 if the core of the FUR is located within a coalfield 
4 Coalfield: hinterland Dummy = 1 if the hinterland of the FUR is located in a coalfield 
5 Port Size * Volume of port trade in 1969 (100 tons) 
6 Agriculture * Proportion of labour force in agriculture in surrounding NUTS 2 in 1975 
7 Unemployment * Unemployment rate (average as proportion of LF between 1977 and 1981)
National Non-FUR Growth Growth of GDP p.c. in the territory of each country outside the FURs(annualised rate between 1978/80 and 1992/94) 8 
Policy Incentive * Ratio of the population of the largest governmental unit associated with the FUR to that of the FUR in 1981 9 
10 Integration Gain Change in economic potential for FUR resulting from pre-Treaty of Rome EEC to post enlargement EU with reduced transport costs, normalised. 
11 Peripherality  Dummy = 1 if the FUR is more than 10 hours away from Brussels 
12 University Students * Ratio of university students (1977-78) to total employment (1979) 
13 R&D Facilities * R&D laboratories of Fortune 500 companies per 1000 inhabitants in 1980 
Unemployment Density  
Sum of differences between the unemployment rate (average as 
proportion of LF between 1977 and 1981) of a FUR and the rates in 
neighbouring FURs (within 2 hours), discounted by distance (with 10
hours time penalty for national borders) 
14 
Sum of university students per employees in neighbouring FURs (within 
2.5 hours), discounted by distance (with 10 hours time penalty for national 
borders) 
15 University Students Density 
Sum of R&D laboratories per 1000 inhabitants in neighbouring FURs 
(within 2.5 hours), discounted by distance (with 10 hours time penalty for 
national borders) 
16 R&D Facilities Density 
Note: * denotes variables tried with a quadratic specification for reasons explained in the text: never entered as 
squared value alone.  
 
To estimate the Policy Incentive variable the rules determining the selection of the largest 'relevant' 
governmental unit were: 
Belgium The central communes for all except Bruxelles for which the capital region 
(Arrondissement) was taken; 
Denmark Central Municipality; 
Germany The Kreisfreie Stadte except for Bremen and Hamburg where the NUTS 1 
Land region was taken and Frankfurt where the Umlandverband was taken; 
France Since there is a NUTS 1 region, the Ile de France, which has significant 
powers, was selected for Paris. Elsewhere in France the central Commune was 
selected except for those FURs for which a Communité Urbaine exists; in 
those cases the Communité Urbaine was selected 
Greece The central Municipality; 
Ireland The County Borough (of Dublin); 
Italy The central Commune was selected in all cases. Unlike the situation in France 
(Paris) or Germany (Bremen and Hamburg) there is no NUTS 1 or 2 region 
corresponding to any city nor is there any city with a city wide tier of 
government (such as the Communité Urbaine). 
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The Netherlands The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Portugal The central Municipality (as Italy); 
Spain Where there was one major FUR in a Communidad Autonoma (a NUTS 2 
region), the Communidad Autonoma was selected; where there was more than 
one major FUR in the Communidad Autonoma but only one in the Provincia (a 
NUTS 3 region), the Provincia was selected; where there was more than one 
major FUR within a Provincia then the central Municipio was selected; 
United Kingdom In England, the District was selected except in London where Inner London 
was used; in Scotland, the regions of Lothian and Strathclyde were taken and 
for Belfast the NUTS 1 region of Northern Ireland was the government unit 
identified. 
 
The only case, then, for which no obvious rule was available, was that of London because of the 
abolition of London-wide government in the middle of the period. In 1985, local government powers 
were re-assigned down to the 32 boroughs and up to committees of boroughs and to central government. 
There were further changes to this system in the later part of the period when the Government Office for 
London was set up.  The only stable unit of government relating to London was the City of London or 
the individual London boroughs but there was a regional authority – Greater London – for some of the 
period. The selection of Inner London - not really a governmental unit at all - represented no more than 
the most reasonable compromise. We tested alternatives and as might be expected, substituting the value 
for the largest borough or the GLC as a whole made no material difference to the results reported here. 
 
Appendix 1 Table 2: Sources for other data 
Variable  
Number  
1 National Censuses of population or – where unavailable – national registration data 
2 Area from administrative maps 
Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, Oxford: OUP, 1971 3 
Oxford Regional Economic Atlas, Oxford: OUP, 1971 4 
Hanbusch der Europaischen Seehafen Band II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX & X Hamburg: 
Verlag Weltarchiv, various dates from 1968 5 
6 Eurostat NUTS2 data 
7 Estimated from Eurostat NUTS3 data 
8 GDP data from Eurostat: see text for further explanation. 
9 See text and above for details. 
10 Estimated from Clark et al 1969 and Keeble et al 1988 
11 Time distance measured using standard road freight software: Microsoft 
University Students taken from The International Association of Universities, International 
Handbook of Universities, 1978, (seventh edition), London: The Macmillan Press; Association of 
Commonwealth Universities, Commonwealth University Yearbook 1979, 1978, (fifty-fifth 
edition) London: The Association of Commonwealth Universities; and The World of Learning 
1978-1979, 1978, (twenty-ninth edition), London: Europa Publications: total employment 
estimated from Eurostat data 
12 
R&D laboratories of Fortune top 500 companies as reported in Directory of European Research, 
London: Longman, 1982  13 
Unemployment as per variable 7: time-distances here and elsewhere from standard road freight 
software - Microsoft. 14 
15 University Students as per variable 12: time-distance as elsewhere 
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Appendix 1 Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
FUR Annualised Growth Rate 0.0609 0.0069 0.0457 0.0809 
Population Size 13.8461 0.6929 12.7566 16.1214 
Population Density 0.5337 0.6378 0.0448 4.4784 
Coalfield: core 0.1570 0.3653 0.0000 1.0000 
Coalfield: hinterland 0.0661 0.2495 0.0000 1.0000 
Port Size 0.0086 0.0217 0.0000 0.1904 
Agriculture 0.0959 0.0946 0.0036 0.4090 
Unemployment 0.0787 0.0332 0.0186 0.1774 
National Non-FUR Growth 0.0622 0.0042 0.0550 0.0801 
Policy Incentive 0.4927 0.3633 0.0927 2.5032 
Integration Gain 0.4370 0.2485 0.0000 1.0000 
Peripherality  0.3223 0.4693 0.0000 1.0000 
University Students 0.0490 0.0387 0.0000 0.2113 
R&D Facilities 0.0011 0.0016 0.0000 0.0069 
Unemployment Density  0.0000 0.2142 -0.8426 1.0740 
University Student Density 0.3404 0.5405 0.0000 2.7126 





Appendix 2: Major Functional Urban Regions (FURs) 
Appendix 2 Table 1: List of the Major FURs in EU12. 
Code Name Code Name Code Name 
1 Antwerpen 42 La Coruña 83 Milano 
2 Bruxelles-Brussel 43 Madrid 84 Napoli 
3 Charleroi 44 Málaga 85 Padova 
4 Liège 45 Murcia 86 Palermo 
5 Århus 46 Palma De Mallorca 87 Roma 
6 Københavns 47 Sevilla 88 Taranto 
7 Aachen 48 Valencia 89 Torino 
8 Augsburg 49 Valladolid 90 Venezia 
9 Bielefeld 50 Vigo 91 Verona 
10 Bochum 51 Zaragoza 92 Amsterdam 
11 Bonn 52 Bordeaux 93 Rotterdam 
12 Braunschweig 53 Clermont-Ferrand 94 S-Gravenhage 
13 Bremen 54 Dijon 95 Utrecht 
14 Dortmund 55 Grenoble 96 Lisboa 
15 Düsseldorf 56 Le Havre 97 Porto 
16 Duisburg 57 Lille 98 Belfast 
17 Essen 58 Lyon 99 Birmingham 
18 Frankfurt 59 Marseille 100 Brighton 
19 Hamburg 60 Montpellier 101 Bristol 
20 Hannover 61 Mulhouse 102 Cardiff 
21 Karlsruhe 62 Nancy 103 Coventry 
22 Kassel 63 Nantes 104 Derby 
23 Köln 64 Nice 105 Edinburgh 
24 Krefeld 65 Orléans 106 Glasgow 
25 Mannheim 66 Paris 107 Hull 
26 Mönchengladbach 67 Rennes 108 Leeds 
27 München 68 Rouen 109 Leicester 
28 Münster 69 St. Etienne 110 Liverpool 
29 Nürnberg 70 Strasbourg 111 London 
30 Saarbruecken 71 Toulon 112 Manchester 
31 Stuttgart 72 Toulouse 113 Newcastle 
32 Wiesbaden 73 Valenciennes 114 Nottingham 
33 Wuppertal 74 Dublin 115 Plymouth 
34 Athinai 75 Bari 116 Portsmouth 
35 Saloniki 76 Bologna 117 Sheffield 
36 Alicante 77 Brescia 118 Southampton 
37 Barcelona 78 Cagliari 119 Stoke 
38 Bilbao 79 Catania 120 Sunderland 
39 Cordoba 80 Firenze 121 Teesside 
40 Gijon/Aviles 81 Genova   
41 Granada 82 Messina   
 
The boundaries of the above FURs are shown in the figure below. In order to make boundary 
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